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The Impacts of Retail Promotions on the Demand for Orange Juice: 




Food retailers use temporary price reductions, feature advertising, and displays to 
increase sales, revenues, and market shares.  Feature advertising has been a common 
retail practice and includes retailer specific best-food-day advertising, store flyers, 
circulars, and other materials.  Most of the retail advertisements are brand specific with 
some being major and others are relatively minor (line ads). 
In-store promotional displays include the display of the products in secondary 
locations, cut cases placed next to regular shelf location, and those displays in primary 
locations but with special efforts.  Displays give the product of interest more visibility 
and may increase the sales of the product.  Temporary price reductions (TPRs), as 
defined in this study are price decreases that are greater than 5% of the regular prices (a 
regular price is the median of all prices within 5% of the maximum price in the previous 
seven weeks). 
Sometimes feature advertising and displays may come with price reductions.  
When price reductions are used with feature advertising and displays, additional price 
effects on the sales of the products of interest could occur.  In addition, a price reduction 
itself may have a separate advertising effect on the demand for the product of interest.  
Generally, increased sales of the brands or products as a result of feature advertising and 
displays come from at least three sources: the decreased sales of competing brands or 
products, more buying customers, and more purchases per buying customer.  When most 
of the increased demand for the product or brand of interest comes from decreased sales   3 
of competing brands or products in the same store, the store may not benefit from 
promoting brand or product.  When the increased demand of the product comes from 
decreased demand for similar products in competing stores, the retailer could benefit 
from the promotion.  The purpose of this study is to examine the impacts of TPRs, brand 
feature ads, and displays on the demands for different brands of orange juice (OJ) in a 
retail chain and competing stores in the same trading area. 
Methodology 
Following Barten, an approximation to demand is the Rotterdam model which can 
be written as 
(1)  widlnqi = miDQ + Sj pijdlnpj + SjSk bij
kdaj
k,     i = 1, 2, . . ., n; 
 
where wi = piqi/m is the budget share for good i with pi and qi being the price and 
quantity of good I, and m being income; mi = pi(¶qi/¶m) is the marginal propensity to 
consume; DQ = Si widlnqi is the Divisia volume index; pij = (pipj/m)sij is the Slutsky 
coefficient, with sij = (¶qi/¶pj + qj¶qi/¶m) or the element in the ith row and jth column of 
the substitution matrix; bij
k = wi(¶lnqi/¶aj
k) is a promotional tactic coefficient indicating 
the impact of the kth tactic used in promoting product j on the demand for product i.  The 
general restrictions on demand are 
(2)  adding up: Si mi = 1 and Si pij = 0; Si bij
k = 0 
homogeneity: Sj pij = 0; and  
symmetry: pij = pji. 
The promotional (feature ad and display) coefficients can be written as (Brown and Lee 
1993, 2002)   4 
(3)  bij
k = -Sj pih ghj
k,  i, j = 1, 2, . . ., n, 
where ghj
k =¶ln(¶u/¶qh)/¶aj
k for i, h = 1, . . ., n. 
Expressions (3) can be used to impose restrictions on the effects of retail 
promotional tactics on demand (Brown and Lee 1993, 2002; Duffy 1987, 1989; Theil 
1980).  Because of the limited observations available for the study, the parameter space is 
reduced to a manageable size.  Following Theil (1980), we assume that promotional 
tactics only affect marginal utility of the brand in question, resulting in the restriction bij
k 
= - pij gjj
k, and that tactic k is equally effective across brands, further resulting in gjj
k = g
k.  
Hence, equation (3) becomes 
  bij
k = - pij g
k. 
Imposing the forgoing promotional restrictions, the demand model (1) can be 
written as  
(4)  widlnqi = miDQ + Sj pij(dlnpj - Sk g
kdaj
k),   i, j = 1, 2, . . ., n. 
In this case, the demand elasticity of a retail promotional tactic is  
(5)  (¶lnqi/¶lnaj
k) = -(pij g
k)aj
k/wi. 
The marginal impact of a tactic on demand is estimated as (this result is an 
approximation, see Barten for further discussion) 
  dqi = -(pij g
k/wi)qidaj
k; 
and the marginal impacts on retail revenue can be written as 
(6)  pi dqi = -pi (pij g
k/wi)(qidaj
k). 
Note that  





kSi (pij/wi)(piqi/m)    5 
= -g
k*m*daj
kSi pij  
= 0,  
because of the adding-up restriction, Sipij = 0.  Thus, in the Rotterdam model, although 
any change in promotional activities would reallocate total expenditure to across goods, 
total expenditure remains constant. 
Data  
Nielsen provided weekly data on gallon sales, prices, and TRP, brand feature ads 
only, displays only, and feature ads and displays.  The promotional variables are 
measured in terms of %ACV.  The period from weeks ending on 07/03/04 through 
06/24/06 (104 weeks) was studied.  Demand model (4) was applied to sales data for a 
retail chain.  The chain in question will be referred to as Retailer X in this study and 
competing grocery stores will be called X COMP.  Five brands of orange juice – Minute 
Maid, Tropicana, Florida’s Natural, Private Labels, and Other Brands were analyzed.  In 
this study, we distinguish between the same brand of OJ sold by Retailer X versus 
competing stores, e.g., Private Label OJ in Retailer X stores is treated as a different brand 
of OJ from Private Label OJ in competing stores.  Hence, there are ten OJ brands 
considered – five sold by Retailer X and five sold by competing stores. 
Results 
Table 1 shows the iterative seemingly unrelated regression estimates of equation 
(8) with homogeneity and symmetry imposed.  The data for (8) add up by construction 
and the equation for Other OJ was deleted (Barten 1969).  The estimates are invariant to 
the equation deleted, and the parameters of the deleted equation can be recovered by   6 
using the demand restrictions (equation (6)) or by simply re-running the model deleting a 
different equation. 
The marginal propensities to consume (MPC, mi) for all juices are positive and 
statistically different from zero except the ones for Private Label OJ in Retailer X and 
Other OJ sold by Retailer X’s competitors, which are both negative but significant and 
the MPC estimate for Florida’s Natural OJ in Retailer X, which was positive but 
insignificant.  All own-price Slutsky coefficients are negative and statistically different 
from zero.  Of the 45 cross-price Slutsky coefficients, 18 are positive and statistically 
different zero, and four are negative and significant, while the remaining 23 are not 
statistically different from zero.  The cross-price estimates for the brands in the same 
stores (Retailer X or Retailer X’s competitors) are all positive, an indication that the 
different brands in the same store are substitutes (Table 3).  Note that X COMP is the 
aggregate of all Retailer X’s competing stores in the trading area; the aggregated data 
may not as clean as the data for Retailer X.  As a result of the aggregation, some of the 
cross-price coefficient estimates do not have expected signs. 
The coefficient estimates for the four retail promotional tactic variables are 
positive, indicating these promotional activities had positive impacts on consumers’ 
marginal utilities for the products studied.  However, the estimate for TPRs was 
statistically not different from zero, i.e., TPRs had no additional advertising impacts on 
the gallon sales of the OJ brands studied (TPRs did impact demand, however through 
prices).  The magnitudes of the promotional activity parameters show that feature ads and 
displays had the highest impact on OJ demand, which is followed by displays only, and 
feature ads only, TPRs had the least impact.   7 
Because the estimate for TPRs is statistically not different from zero, this retail 
promotional tactic will not be discussed further.  The impacts of a ten %ACV points 
increase in the rest three promotional tactics, i.e., feature ad only, displays only, and 
feature ad and displays, evaluated at sample means, are presented in Table 2.   
Results indicate that promotional activities increased the demand for the 
brand/product being promoted; therefore, there is an incentive for brand owners to 
promote their products using TPR, feature ads, and displays.  Retail promotions often 
come with price reductions.  As shown in this study, price reductions or increases could 
result in positive or negative revenue gains depending on consumers’ responses to these 
price changes.  Whether a retailer can benefit from these promotional activities depends 
on the type of promotion, the brand being promoted, and whether there is a price 
reduction.  Results show that the combination of feature ads and displays had the largest 
impacts on retail revenue among the four promotional tactics studied and temporary price 
reduction had no advertising impact on retail revenue.  Results also show that when 
Retailer X promotes an OJ brand using any of the tactics examined in this study, a larger 
portion of the increased demand for promoted brand comes from reduced demand for 
Other Brand OJ sold by Retailer X and a smaller portion comes from the decreased 
demand in Retailer X’s competing stores in the same trading area.   8 
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Table 1.  Parameter estimates 
Retailer X  X COMP 
  mi  MM  Trop  FN  PL  Other  MM  Trop  FN  PL  Other 
    Slutsky Coefficient (pij) 
MM  0.3613*  -0.4627*  0.1238*  0.1124*  0.0350*  0.0159*  0.0197*  0.0769*  0.0203*  0.0775*  -0.0188* 
  (0.0378)  (0.0320)  (0.0122)  (0.0217)  (0.0179)  (0.0069)  (0.0095)  (0.0152)  (0.0078)  (0.0122)  (0.0105) 
Tropicana  0.2709*    -0.4610*  0.1175*  0.0954*  0.0212*  0.0272*  0.0453*  0.0089*  0.0414*  -0.0197* 
  (0.0390)    (0.0166)  (0.0129)  (0.0124)  (0.0032)  (0.0046)  (0.0080)  (0.0037)  (0.0071)  (0.0056) 
FN  0.0338      -0.4079*  0.0690*  0.0186*  0.0170*  0.0443*  0.0115**  0.0041  0.0134 
  (0.0430)      (0.0323)  (0.0188)  (0.0067)  (0.0098)  (0.0157)  (0.0077)  (0.0126)  (0.0103) 
PL  -0.0990*        -0.2462*  0.0206*  0.0009  0.0315*  -0.0102**  -0.0117  0.0156* 
  (0.0469)        (0.0236)  (0.0059)  (0.0077)  (0.0096)  (0.0061)  (0.0110)  (0.0081) 
Other  0.0140**          -0.0947*  0.0065  0.0089  0.0012  0.0027  -0.0008 
  (0.0089)          (0.0098)  (0.0054)  (0.0058)  (0.0042)  (0.0040)  (0.0060) 
MM  0.1132*            -0.1287*  0.0239*  0.0132*  0.0134*  0.0069 
  (0.0144)            (0.0087)  (0.0073)  (0.0048)  (0.0058)  (0.0071) 
Tropicana  0.1478*              -0.3202*  0.0454*  0.0295*  0.0144 
  (0.0257)              (0.0193)  (0.0066)  (0.0082)  (0.0106) 
FN  0.0406*                -0.1105*  0.0079*  0.0124* 
  (0.0114)                (0.0062)  (0.0046)  (0.0055) 
PL  0.1893*                  -0.1742*  0.0093** 
  (0.0242)                  (0.0110)  (0.0067) 
Other  -0.0718*                    -0.0327* 
  (0.0167)                    (0.0160) 
                       
TPR  0.000012                     
  (0.00007)                     
Feature  0.0004*                     
  (0.0001)                     
Displays  0.0013*                     
  (0.0007)                     
F&D  0.0040*                     
  (0.0008)                     
The numbers in parentheses are standard errors of the estimates. 
*Statistically different from zero at a = 0.05 level.      ** Statistically different from zero at a = 0.10 level. 
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Table 2.  Estimated revenue impacts of retail promotional tactics from a 10 point increase in %ACV 
In Retailer X   In X COMP 
  MM  Trop  FN  PL  Other  MM  Trop  FN  PL  Other 
  Feature Ads 
MM  8,279  -2,233  -2,029  -619  -281  -348  -1,362  -361  -1,395  328 
Tropicana  -2,214  8,320  -2,121  -1,689  -375  -478  -802  -159  -745  343 
FN  -2,012  -2,121  7,363  -1,221  -328  -300  -785  -205  -74  -234 
PL  -626  -1,722  -1,246  4,357  -364  -16  -557  181  210  -272 
Other  -285  -383  -335  -365  1,672  -114  -157  -21  -49  14 
MM*  -353  -490  -307  -16  -114  2,267  -424  -235  -241  -119 
Tropicana*  -1,376  -818  -800  -557  -157  -422  5,670  -810  -531  -251 
FN*  -362  -161  -208  180  -20  -232  -804  1,972  -142  -77 
PL*  -1,387  -747  -74  207  -48  -236  -523  -140  3,133  -162 
Other*  337  355  -243  -276  14  -121  -255  -221  -168  570 
   Gain  3,142  1,861  1,632  463  325  1,256  3,664  565  2,052  -39 
  Displays 
MM  29,440  -7,942  -7,216  -2,202  -998  -1,237  -4,842  -1,285  -4,960  1,165 
Tropicana  -7,874  29,587  -7,544  -6,006  -1,332  -1,701  -2,852  -565  -2,649  1,219 
FN  -7,153  -7,542  26,182  -4,342  -1,165  -1,066  -2,792  -730  -262  -833 
PL  -2,226  -6,125  -4,429  15,492  -1,293  -57  -1,982  644  747  -965 
Other  -1,012  -1,362  -1,191  -1,296  5,945  -406  -558  -73  -173  48 
MM*  -1,256  -1,743  -1,093  -57  -407  8,061  -1,508  -836  -857  -425 
Tropicana*  -4,893  -2,907  -2,846  -1,981  -557  -1,500  20,162  -2,882  -1,890  -892 
FN*  -1,288  -572  -738  639  -72  -826  -2,861  7,011  -504  -273 
PL*  -4,933  -2,657  -262  735  -169  -839  -1,860  -500  11,143  -578 
Other*  1,197  1,262  -863  -981  49  -429  -907  -785  -597  2,027 
   Gain  11,175  6,616  5,802  1,645  1,157  4,467  13,027  2,008  7,296  -140 
  Feature Ads and Displays 
MM  92,496  -24,952  -22,672  -6,918  -3,137  -3,886  -15,214  -4,036  -15,585  3,661 
Tropicana  -24,739  92,957  -23,701  -18,871  -4,185  -5,346  -8,962  -1,775  -8,322  3,829 
FN  -22,474  -23,697  82,261  -13,643  -3,659  -3,350  -8,772  -2,292  -822  -2,616 
PL  -6,994  -19,243  -13,915  48,674  -4,063  -178  -6,228  2,024  2,348  -3,033 
Other  -3,180  -4,278  -3,742  -4,073  18,678  -1,275  -1,755  -230  -542  151 
MM*  -3,947  -5,476  -3,433  -179  -1,278  25,327  -4,737  -2,628  -2,691  -1,334 
Tropicana*  -15,374  -9,134  -8,942  -6,225  -1,749  -4,713  63,347  -9,055  -5,937  -2,802 
FN*  -4,048  -1,796  -2,319  2,008  -228  -2,595  -8,988  22,027  -1,583  -856 
PL*  -15,500  -8,347  -824  2,310  -532  -2,635  -5,843  -1,570  35,008  -1,815 
Other*  3,760  3,967  -2,711  -3,082  153  -1,349  -2,849  -2,465  -1,874  6,368 
   Net Gain  35,109  20,787  18,230  5,168  3,634  14,035  40,930  6,309  22,922  -440 
                     
   % Net Gain  38.0%  22.4%  22.2%  10.6%  19.5%  55.4%  64.6%  28.6%  65.5%  -31.3% 
*OJ brands in X COMP. 
 